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Abstract
We consider an example of a sentence which according to Hintikka’s claim essentially requires
for its logical form a Henkin quanti.er. We show that if Hintikka is right then recognizing the
truth value of the sentence in .nite models is an NP-complete problem. We discuss also possible
conclusions from this observation.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
MSC: 03C13; 68Q19; 03C80; 03B65; 03A05
Keywords: NP-completeness; PTIME; Henkin quanti.ers; Edmond’s Thesis; Church’s Thesis
1. Introduction
In this paper, we discuss the semantics of some natural language constructions from
the point of view of computational complexity. Many natural language sentences have
.nite domains as their intended interpretations. As examples of such sentences we can
consider the following:
1. The majority voted for Mr Brown.
2. Every second person went to a discoteque.
These two sentences can be interpreted in a natural way only in .nite domains. Con-
sidering such sentences and their possible .nite models we can ask about the compu-
tational complexity of recognizing their truth value in these models.
In the case of sentences (1) and (2) the complexity of this problem is relatively
low. Model checking for them can be carried out by means of push–down automata.
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However, for some sentences the problem of recognizing their truth value can be of
much higher complexity. In this paper we discuss an example of such a sentence.
There is a quite common naABve view, according to which for each sentence in a
language known to us, having a complete description of a possible domain interpreting
the sentence, we are in a position to .nd the truth value of the sentence. Let us stress
that “naABve” does not necessarily mean false. Nevertheless, the example discussed in
this paper can be considered as a possible counterexample to this “naABve” view.
There is another “naABve” view according to which real semantics of natural language
sentences can be described in terms of a single mechanism operating in an uniform
way on various sentences. Our example seems to be a good counterexample also to
this naABve view.
The main problem discussed in the paper is based on Hintikka’s claim that some
natural language sentences require for their logical form an essential use of branched
quanti.ers, also called Henkin quanti.ers. 1
2. The Hintikka thesis
We will discuss here Hintikka’s thesis about logical forms of some natural language
sentences. Hintikka claimed in [5] that logical forms of sentences like
(?) Some relative of each villager and some relative of each townsman hate each
other.
essentially require nonlinear quanti.cation. In particular, the logical form of (?) should
be written down as follows:
(??)
∀x∃y
∀z∃w ((V (x) ∧ T (z)) ⇒ (R(x; y) ∧ R(z; w) ∧ H (y; w))):
Hintikka’s formula is equivalent to the following:
∃f∃g∀x∀z ((V (x) ∧ T (z)) ⇒ (R(x; f(x)) ∧ R(z; g(z)) ∧ H (f(x); g(z))));
which is equivalent to the formula with second order quanti.cation over only unary
variables. 2
∃A∃B ∀x∀z((V (x) ∧ T (z)) ⇒ (∃y ∈ A R(x; y) ∧ ∃w ∈ B R(z; w)
∧∀y ∈ A ∀w ∈ B H (y; w)):
Formula (??) is not equivalent to any .rst order formula (see the Barwise–Kunen
theorem in [1]). The “weak reading” or “linear reading” of Hintikka’s sentence assigns
to (?) the following logical form:
∀x∀z∃y∃w ((V (x) ∧ T (z)) ⇒ (R(x; y) ∧ R(z; w) ∧ H (y; w))):
1 The original de.nition of Henkin quanti.ers was presented in [4]. See also [6,8].
2 This was observed by Stenius [9].
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By Hintikka’s thesis we mean the following:
Thesis 1 (Hintikka [5]). Sentences like (?) have essentially nonlinear logical forms.
In particular, sentence (?) should be interpreted as (??).
An improved version of the thesis was presented in [7].
Thesis 2 (Hintikka’s thesis, an improved version [7]). Sentences like (?) should be
interpreted as
(∀x : V (x))(∃y : R(x; y))
(∀z : T (z))(∃w : R(z; w)) H (y; w);
which is equivalent to the following second-order sentence:
∃S1; S2 (∀x(V (x) ⇒ ∃y(S1(y) ∧ R(x; y)))
∧∀z(T (z) ⇒ ∃w(S2(w) ∧ R(z; w)))
∧∀y; w((S1(y) ∧ S2(w)) ⇒ H (y; w))):
The improvement is motivated by the observation that from (?) the following can
be inferred.
Each villager has a relative.
This sentence can be false in an interpretation with an empty town. However, in each
such interpretation (??) is true. This sentence obviously has the following logical form:
∀x(V (x) ⇒ ∃yR(x; y)):
The improved version of Hintikka’s formula is equivalent to the following one:
(???)∃A∃B (∀x(V (x) ⇒ ∃y ∈ A R(x; y)) ∧ ∀z(T (z) ⇒ ∃w ∈ B R(z; w))
∧∀y ∈ A ∀w ∈ B H (y; w)):
In what follows we will refer to (???) as “Hintikka’s formula”.
What is essential in Hintikka’s formula from the computational complexity point of
view can be captured by the generalized quanti.er 3 Z such that the formula
Zxy(’(x; y);  (x; y))
3 It is a slightly modi.ed version of the quanti.er discussed in [7].
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Fig. 1. Barwise’s diagram. The villagers and townsmen are dots and stars, respectively. The relation of
being relatives is interpreted as being in the same hut. The relation of hating each other is interpreted as
the symmetric relation between dots and stars not joined by an edge.
is interpreted as
∃A∃B(∀x∃y ∈ A ’(x; y) ∧ ∀x∃y ∈ B ’(x; y) ∧ ∀x ∈ A∀y ∈ B  (x; y)):
The generalized quanti.er Z is called Hintikka’s form. 4
Hintikka’s thesis was intensively discussed in the 1970s. One of the most impor-
tant papers on the topic was [1], where Barwise tried to summarize the discussion.
Discussing arguments for and against the thesis, he observed that all of them but one
support the thesis. The one against was his original argument. Barwise had tested
people on recognizing the logical value of (?) on pictures describing graphically one
of the possible situations expressed by the sentence. He showed them pictures like
the one in Fig. 1 and asked whether (?) held in the situation corresponding to the
picture.
Let us observe that the picture in Fig. 1 is slightly more complicated than it looks
at .rst sight, because the relation H is to be interpreted as “not being joined by an
edge”.
4 See [7].
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According to Barwise the majority of people looking at the picture accepted (?).
However, in the model corresponding to the picture in Fig. 1 the formula (???) is
false, but the linear reading of (?) remains true. This observation of Barwise was
treated by him as a conclusive argument against Hintikka’s thesis.
Some doubts against this conclusion were raised in [7]. In particular, it was suggested
there that the problem of recognizing the truth value of (???) would be NPTIME-
hard. 5 In the next section we prove the following:
Theorem 2.1. The problem of recognizing the truth value of (??), as well as (???), in
8nite models is NPTIME-complete. Therefore, assuming Hintikka’s thesis, the prob-
lem of recognizing the truth value of sentences like (?) is also NP-complete.
On the basis of a few natural assumptions about our cognitive mechanisms, Edmond’s
Thesis, and assuming P = NP, we will conclude that our understanding of sentences
like (?) is based on diLerent semantical mechanisms than recognizing their truth value
in speci.c .nitely described situations.
3. NP-completeness of Hintikka’s sentence
Now we are going to de.ne a model theoretic version of the problem CNF-SAT.
Let KCNF 6 be the class of .nite models M = (U; R; N ) such that R is an equivalence
on U and N is a binary symmetric relation on U , and additionally M satis.es the
following .rst-order formulae:
∀x∀y(N (x; y) ⇒ N (y; x));
∀x∀y∀z((N (x; y) ∧ N (y; z)) ⇒ ¬N (x; z));
∀x∀y∀z∀w((N (x; y) ∧ N (x; z) ∧ N (w; y)) ⇒ N (w; z)):
Intuitively, such models can be identi.ed with propositional formulae in CNF form.
In this case U is the set of literals occurring in the formula, where literals in diLerent
conjuncts are treated as diLerent. R says that two literals are from the same conjunct,
and N says that one of two literals is the negation of the other.
Let us observe that our model-theoretic representation of formulae in CNF form is
not faithful. In particular, we lose the information which literals in diLerent conjuncts
are identical.
For any sentential formula ’ we can construct a model M’ = (U; R; N ) conforming
to the rules described.
5 NP (NPTIME) is the class of problems which can be computed by nondeterministic Turing machines
in polynomial time. P (PTIME) is the class of problems which can be computed by deterministic Turing
machines in polynomial time.
6 CNF means Conjunctive Normal Form. A formula is in CNF form if it is a conjunction of disjunctions
of literals. A literal is a sentential variable or its negation.
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Lemma 3.1. There is a PTIME 7 mapping ’ →M’ = (U; R; N ) such that ’ is sat-
is8able if and only if there is A⊆U such that A2 ∩N = ∅ and A has a nonempty
intersection with each equivalence class of R. Equivalently, M’ satis8es the for-
mula ’SAT
∃A(∀x∃y ∈ A R(x; y) ∧ ∀x ∈ A ∀y ∈ A ¬N (x; y)):
The class to which the reduction of CNF-SAT is de.ned in the lemma will be
denoted as KCNF-SAT. So we de.ne
KCNF-SAT = {M ∈ KCNF : M |= ’SAT}:
We claim that KCNF-SAT is a good model-theoretic representation of the problem
SAT.
Lemma 3.2. For each  in CNF form,  is satis8able if and only if M |=’SAT.
Proof. Let  be a sentential formula in CNF form.
If  is satis.able, then for some valuation v we have v( ) = 1. We de.ne the required
set A⊆ |M | as the set of all those literals which are true according to v.
Let M = (U; R; N ) |= ’SAT. Then there is A ⊆ |M | witnessing the second order
existential quanti.er in ’SAT. We de.ne a valuation v as follows. Let p be a sentential
variable occurring in  . v(p) = 1 if there is a positive literal obtained from p which
belongs to A, otherwise v(p) = 0.
It remains to prove that v( ) = 1. Let us assume that v( ) = 0, then some conjunct
1∨ · · ·∨k in  is false under v. However, at least one of the literals in this conjunct
has been chosen by A, say i. We have v(i) = 0, then by the de.nition of v, i is of
the form ¬p and v(p) = 1. Hence some literal ′ corresponding to p has been chosen
by A, but i and ′ are in the relation N , which is impossible.
Theorem 3.1. The class KCNF-SAT is de8nable by means of Hintikka’s form.
Proof. Let us consider the following formula ’:
Zxy(R(x; y); (¬N (x; y) ∧ (R(x; y) ⇒ x = y))):
This formula is equivalent to the following:
∃A∃B(∀x∃y ∈ A R(x; y) ∧ ∀x∃y ∈ B R(x; y)
∧∀x ∈ A ∀y ∈ B (¬N (x; y) ∧ (R(x; y) ⇒ x = y)):
We claim that ’ is equivalent to ’SAT in models from KCNF.
7 As a matter of fact we can require this mapping to be a .rst order reduction (see [8]) and thus also a
LOGSPACE reduction.
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The implication (’SAT ⇒’) holds in KCNF, because having A which is a witness for
’SAT we can choose the smallest subset A0 of A which still is a witness for ’SAT, and
A=B=A0 will be a pair of witnesses for ’.
For the other direction, let us assume that we have two sets A and B such that
∀x∃y ∈ A R(x; y);
∀x∃y ∈ B R(x; y);
∀x ∈ A ∀y ∈ B (¬N (x; y) ∧ (R(x; y) ⇒ x = y)):
It suMces to prove that A=B provided R is an equivalence relation. Let x∈A. Then
there is y∈B such that R(x; y), so x =y∈B. Therefore A ⊆ B. Similarly we prove
that B⊆A.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. We will de.ne a PTIME translation of sentential formulae in
CNF form,  → M˜  , such that  is satis.able if and only if M˜  is a model for
(???). Firstly we construct M = (U; R; N ) for a given  . Then we take two disjoint
copies of (U; R), say (U1; R1) and (U2; R2). We de.ne U ′ =U1 ∪U2, T =U1, V =U2,
R′ =R1 ∪R2, H = {(a; b) : a∈U1; b∈U2, and a; b were obtained from elements of U
which are not in the relation N}. Let M˜  be (U ′; T; V; R′; H). Obviously, we have
M |= ’SAT if and only if (???) is true in M˜  :
Since the problem CNF-SAT is NP-complete, 8 by Lemma 3.2 this proves our
theorem.
4. Inferential and referential meaning
It was observed in [7] that we can assign meanings to a sentence of natural language
in at least two possible ways: the .rst one gives a referential meaning and is established
by investigating how users of the language evaluate the truth value of the sentence in
various situations. The other one gives an inferential meaning. If we know the meanings
of some sentences and inferential relations of our sentence with these other sentences,
then it is possible that the inferential meaning we have assigned to our sentence is
ambiguous.
Let us consider two examples of obvious inferences in which diMcult sentences are
involved.
(A) From the sentence
Some relative of each villager and some relative of each townsman hate each other.
the following can be inferred:
8 See e.g. [3].
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Each villager has a relative.
(B) From the sentences:
1. Each villager has an oldest relative.
2. Each townsman has an oldest relative.
3. For each villager and for each townsman, their oldest relatives hate each other.
the following can be inferred:
Some relative of each villager and some relative of each townsman hate each other.
For some sentences we can determine their meanings unambiguously—we call them
“easy sentences”. For others, meanings can be assigned only via their inferential re-
lations with other sentences. We will refer to this way of determining meanings as
“semantics given by inferential contexts”.
5. Computational complexity bounds for our minds
Let us discuss shortly our main hypotheses and assumptions related to computational
complexity bounds for our minds. They will be used in the justi.cation of our main
thesis relating NP-complete problems to possible mental abilities.
Church’s Thesis—the psychological version. The computational mechanisms of mind
“do not di<er essentially” from the mechanisms of computation of the computational
machines constructed by human beings.
We explicate “do not diLer essentially” as “are mutually reducible to each other in
polynomial time”.
The Economy Principle. Our minds are only equipped with such mechanisms which
carry out only practically computable operations in a single step.
The problem of practical computability was considered in the middle of the sixties
by mathematician Jack Edmonds. He claims in his paper Paths, trees and =owers [2]
that “the good algorithms” are the polynomially time-bounded algorithms since they
produce outputs in reasonable time.
Edmond’s Thesis. The class of practically computable problems is the same as the
PTIME class.
Some doubts were later raised against Edmond’s Thesis. In particular, not all PTIME
computable problems seem to be practically computable. However, what we really need
in our arguments is a weaker version of the thesis.
The weaker version of Edmond’s Thesis. All practically computable problems are PTIME
computable.
The P=NP? problem. Even though the question whether “P = NP” is still an open
mathematical problem, our programming experience convinces us that the answer is
negative.
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From Church’s Thesis, Edmond’s Thesis, the Economy Principle, and assuming that
P = NP we obtain
The Main Thesis. The mind is not equipped with any mechanism of recognizing
NP-complete problems.
Let us stress that we do not claim that we cannot carry out algorithms for NP-
complete problems, but only that we cannot perform them by means of our “hardware”
in a single step.
Let us observe that the Main Thesis can be obtained directly from the following:
Generalized Edmond’s Thesis. For all physical devices (including human minds),
practical computability (practical performability) is included in PTIME computability.
6. Some conclusions
Here are the main conclusions of our considerations.
1. Our minds are not equipped with any mechanism of recognizing the truth of Hin-
tikka’s sentence for Barwise’s diagrams, provided Hintikka’s Thesis is true.
This follows from the Main Thesis and Theorem 2.1.
2. There are good arguments for Hintikka’s Thesis based on semantics determined by
inferential contexts (see [1,7]).
3. There are two possibilities:
(i) There are some natural language sentences (e.g. Hintikka’s sentence) whose
referential and inferential meanings diLer.
(ii) The empirical argument of Barwise does not work. Hintikka’s sentence has
only meaning determined by inferential contexts. Its meaning in the sense of
recognizing truth is unde.ned.
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